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Do Government Shut Downs Shut Down Aviation Security? 
 
There have been reports of a growing number of Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) agents calling in sick and refusing to work for no pay (1).  The immediate 
question becomes, what’s the impact on aviation security?  The answer is a negative 
one, but not as negative as one might think, and one only adding to festering, pre-
shutdown problems. 
Aviation security begins with the collection and analysis of intelligence to identify various 
threats.  These threats are prioritized by their likelihood of occurrence, how they match 
up with vulnerabilities, and their estimated consequences leading to assessments of 
risk.  Finite human, technological, infrastructural, research and developmental, and 
financial resources are then allocated by decision makers based on counter-threat 
expertise and political pressures and values.  The resulting layered approach to aviation 
security includes (a) information operations to decrease the number of people who wish 
to engage in violating some public’s welfare through an attack; (b) information 
operations to reinforce the psychological resilience of the general public given that 
noxious psychological effect is often the ultimate goal of terrorism and non-political 
attacks against aviation; (c) counterintelligence activities so that people behind the 
threats have the wrong information and make the wrong decisions in their operational 
and support planning and implementation; (d) apprehension of these people well before 
an operation is launched; and (e) placement and use of various human and technical 
resources adjacent to and within airports to identify and apprehend people and 
weapons/weapon components before the latter are deployed and employed.  As 
intelligence continues to be collected and analyzed—and transmitted in a timely and 
secure fashion to security authorities with a need-to-know—layers of aviation security 
should be continuously changing.  After all, threat, vulnerability, and risk are 
continuously changing, as is the world itself. 
As is obvious from the above, TSA agents are a small, if important, piece of a multi-
disciplinary aviation security capability.  And this piece is under significant psychological 
pressure beyond that inherent to security responsibilities.  As there are fewer agents 
available—through calling in sick or quitting—the workload increases for the others or 
security procedures are compromised to do the best possible with the agents available.  
As well, the mental challenge of observing, analyzing and acting on observations, and 
complying with task criteria is compromised.  This occurs through mental intrusions of 
financial worry, anxiety about caring for one’s family and self, noxious emotions about  
insensitive treatment by a large bureaucracy, and fantasies of revenge and what might 
have been if different events had occurred in their lives.       
Unfortunately, these intrusions are not new, even if they may be exacerbated with the 
shutdown.  Optimal human resource management—e. g., attractive salary, respect and 
dignity allocated by higher-ups—has never occurred in the history of TSA as 
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substantiated by high annual personnel turnover (2).  What’s different now is the pile-on 
from the need for some agents to use food banks, unpaid pills, admonitions not to 
speak with journalists, increasing charged expenses and incurring of credit card 
increases, and formal Homeland Security letters that are not honored requesting special 
treatment by creditors.  So the TSA insider threat continues to increase—whether 
through absenteeism, subpar performance, or outright sabotage and subverting the 
mission.   
However, the shutdown is not shutting down aviation security at the moment, and 
probably not in the short term.  A silver lining in the shutdown cloud might be turning the 
page towards treating TSA agents how they should be treated.  As with many service 
providers in many locations, like elementary and secondary school teachers, who 
provide important services to the public, this is not something expected.  Token ad hoc 
stipends and such may be all that’s expected. 
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